ORIGINAL PAPER
Trend of the compensation policy and tactics for the development of mineral resources in China
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1
School of Civil and Resource Engineering,University of Science and Technology Beijing
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Department of Mechanics and Aerospace Engineering, Southern University of Science and Technology
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR
Yiqiao Wang   

School of Civil and Resource Engineering,University of Science and Technology Beijing
Submission date: 2021-05-23
Final revision date: 2021-08-08
Acceptance date: 2021-11-05
Publication date: 2021-12-22
 
Gospodarka Surowcami Mineralnymi – Mineral Resources Management 2021;37(4):29–54
 
KEYWORDS
TOPICS
ABSTRACT
China has been building an ecological compensation system to eliminate the contradiction between economic development and ecological protection. Aiming at conflicts of interest in the implementation of an ecological compensation policy for China’s mineral resource development, this study established a tripartite evolutionary game model to simulate the ecological compensation scenario and determined the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) under different scenarios; it uses numerical simulation to analyse the strategy evolution process of stakeholders and the influence of parameter changes on each strategy. The results show that there is an optimal ESS for ecological compensation for mineral resource development, which condition is C1 < Ti + F1, P < F2, C2 < R1 + R2. The initial cooperation intentions of stakeholders directly affected the final stable state. Local governments are most affected by the input cost, and mining enterprises are most affected by the supervision of the central government. Punishment can effectively restrain the behavior of local governments and mining enterprises and promote the implementation of ecological compensation systems. In addition, the higher supervision cost of the central government, the longer time it will take for the stakeholders to reach the stable state. Finally, reducing the payment amount for ecological compensation will not affect the trend in environmental improvement; in contrast, it is conducive to the preservation of enterprises’ strength, economic development and ecological environment protection. The main findings of this study can help secure coordinate between the stakeholders in conflict and jointly formulate appropriate ecological compensation policy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are grateful to the financial support provided by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 52074022), and the National Key Research and Development Program of China (No. 2018YFC0604400).
METADATA IN OTHER LANGUAGES:
Polish
Trend polityki kompensacyjnej i taktyki wykorzystania zasobów surowców mineralnych w Chinach
kompensacja ekologiczna, eksploatacja surowców mineralnych, trójstronna gra ewolucyjna, strategia stabilna ewolucyjnie, analiza wrażliwości
Artykuł dotyczy bardzo ważnego zadania, jakim jest pogodzenie celów ekonomicznych i środowiskowych w przemyśle wydobywczym Chin. Autorzy budują model uwzględniający interesy firm górniczych, samorządów i władz centralnych, wykorzystują do tego teorię gier. W ramach tych badań ustanowiono trójstronny ewolucyjny model gry do symulacji scenariusza kompensacji ekologicznej i określono strategię stabilną ewolucyjnie ESS (Evolutionary Stable Strategy) dla różnych scenariuszy; wykorzystując symulację numeryczną do analizy procesu ewolucji strategii interesariuszy oraz wpływu zmian parametrów na każdą strategię. Wyniki pokazują, że istnieje optymalny ESS dla ekologicznej kompensacji wykorzystania zasobów surowców mineralnych, którego stan to C1 < Ti + F1, P < F2, C2 < R1 + R2 (określenie parametrów podano w tabeli 2). Początkowe zamiary współpracy interesariuszy bezpośrednio wpłynęły na ostateczny stan stabilności. Samorządy lokalne są najbardziej dotknięte kosztami kapitałowymi, a przedsiębiorstwa górnicze – kosztami nadzoru rządu centralnego. Karanie może skutecznie powstrzymywać zachowania samorządów i przedsiębiorstw górniczych oraz promować wdrażanie systemów rekompensat ekologicznych. Dodatkowo, im wyższy koszt nadzoru ze strony rządu centralnego, tym dłuższy czas osiągnięcia stanu stabilnego przez interesariuszy. Wreszcie, zmniejszenie kwoty płatności na kompensację ekologiczną nie wpłynie na trend poprawy stanu środowiska, natomiast sprzyja zachowaniu siły przedsiębiorstw, rozwojowi gospodarczemu i ochronie środowiska przyrodniczego. Główne wnioski z tego badania mogą być przydatne w zapewnieniu koordynacji między zainteresowanymi stronami w konflikcie i wspólnym sformułowaniu odpowiedniej polityki kompensacji ekologicznej.
 
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